Pearl Harbor

Secrets Impasse Book Reviews Hearings


This web site is not an official U. S. Government publication. It is a private, non-profit undertaking with a life-long commitment to compile the most relevant facts and extract the truths�from a multitude of sources�about the Japanese First Air Fleet attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the days before and after. It is intended to be a "work in progress", ready to accept research assistance, comments and constructive criticism in the quest for the truth.  Simply click this email link if you desire to contact the author.

If you desire to have an uplifting introduction, turn on your speakers and then click on Let's Remember Pearl Harbor.

Destroyer USS Shaw (DD-373) in floating dry-dock, Pearl Harbor Navy Yard
Enemy bombs set her afire and the forward magazines exploded
Photo credit�Navy Source Archives Online

Destroyer USS Shaw (DD-373) repaired at Mare Island and returning to duty in South Pacific, July 5 1942
Photo credit�Navy Source Archives Online

As of this writing, during the past 67 years historians, authors/writers, and publishers have devoted copious  time and effort doing research to document and present to the general public the circumstances surrounding the attack on Pearl Harbor. As an example, at this writing in 2008, the Pearl Harbor "Book" link on the Internet displays 357 best sellers and 8 new releases available on this topic. 

The 873 page masterpiece, At Dawn We Slept, written by Professor Gordon W. Prange�which took 37 years to research�can be purchased at in a used condition for as low as $.01, shipping $3.99. Professor Prange was unable to complete his life's dream; he died in 1980 leaving his wife, Ann, to publish the book in 1981. But it appears that he did not take advantage of the researcher's benefits provided by the Freedom of Information Act passed by President Lyndon B. Johnson on July 4, 1966 (Amended 2002).

Congratulations, Ann Prange! At Dawn We Slept is a historic, literary work of art. It has provided this author, who was too young to serve in WWII, the necessary background to be able to present Professor Prague's historical undertaking on the Internet.

In 1995, fifty years after the end of WWII, Edward L. Beach, Captain, USN (Ret.) wrote and published a book entitled Scapegoats, a defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor.  Since the passing of the Freedom of Information Act , researchers have been able to obtain initially classified secret documents and gain new insight into the actions taken by top military and government leaders, including the President of the United States, before, during and after the war with Japan. Captain Beach joined these researchers and benefited from their labors, while acquiring a clearer vision about Pearl Harbor.

Captain Beach's closing words are extracted from the book's jacket on the back cover.

ADM. Husband E. Kimmel and LT. GEN. Walter C. Short, the military commanders in Hawaii in 1941, paid a high price for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. They were deprived of their good names while others of equal or greater guilt�MacArthur, Marshall, Stark, even Roosevelt�were absolved or not even accused. It may have been political because there was a war to win. But now, half a century later, we have an obligation to address the question of truth and justice, one of the founding canons of our national system. Our country must not continue to perpetuate a lie.

In 2002, Captain Beach wrote an article entitled Senate Exonerates Pearl Harbor Commanders which was published in Naval History on February 2000. His opinion on truth and justice remains constant, and this author supports it wholeheartedly.

Our entire national ethic is based on the ideal of justice for the individual, but it now appears that the higher-ranking the participants, the less likely real justice will occur.

Captain Beach passed away in 2002. His obituary appeared in the Washington Times.

Edward L. Beach, submariner, historian Edward Latimer Beach, a highly decorated World War II naval officer, nuclear submariner and internationally recognized naval author, died of cancer Dec. 1 at his D.C. home. He was 84. Capt. Beach's best known work was his novel, "Run Silent, Run Deep," about submarine war in the Pacific.

But before we enter the maze of intrigue amongst a vast amount of published material, we must consider the main events taking place in the mid-1940's: President Franklin D. Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, World War II in Europe ended in early May 1945, and World War II with Japan ended aboard the USS Missouri on September 2, 1945 when Japan surrendered.

There is no doubt in this authors mind that President Roosevelt, the master spymaster and Commander in Chief of the US Armed Forces, knew that his "angel of death" was nearby because of his failing physical condition, and he also knew that victory in World War II was in the horizon. But most importantly, he knew that a Joint Congressional Committee was standing by to investigate the circumstances surrounding the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. We'll never know what personal arrangements, if any, were made between FDR's personal naval physician, Vice Admiral Ross T. McIntire, and FDR, but it's a known fact that he knew the President was on a dying course with no recovery in sight. The record shows that FDR died of a massive stroke (cerebral hemorrhage) while vacationing in Warm Springs, Georgia. No medical records could be located; no autopsy was performed; all secrets went to the grave.

However, an Internet online account by Dr. Steven Lomazow, M.D. sheds new light on the way FDR controlled any release of his physical condition to the press and/or public.

Any and all information released pertaining to the health of the President was under the direct and strict control of Roosevelt himself. All of Admiral McIntire's public statements about the health of the President, even those after Roosevelt's death in 1945, were made [by McIntire] as a result of the expressed wishes of his Commander-in-Chief [FDR].

A search for President Roosevelt's medical records fails. But an online contribution by Alonzo Hamby in FDR Watch: Health and Final Illness may explain the reason why.

�A Conspiracy of Silence� deals with some of the consequences of FDR�s failing health�notably the choice of Harry Truman for vice-president in 1944�but its major focus and interest is the health issue. Dr. Goldsmith�s Holy Grail was documentary evidence of the Roosevelt-Leahy relationship. Much of his book details his pursuit.

He [Dr. Goldsmith] discovers quickly that Roosevelt�s medical chart�his full medical history�is nowhere to be found and presumably has been destroyed. He also encounters among some physicians who might have been helpful a rather extreme interpretation of the ethic of confidentiality. They feel that neither the death of a subject nor his historical importance warrant the disclosure of secrets. He searches for various functionaries reputed to have some knowledge of Roosevelt�s medical relationships�secretaries, office managers, federal agents, a naval aide who acted as FDR�s masseur and valet�many of them vanished into the quicksand of time.

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Principal Characters Before and After December 7, 1941
Summary of the Attack on December 7, 1941
Japan's Strike Force & Radio Silence
Navy Department Feud�ONI vs. War Plans
Admiral Turner Testifies Before the Hart Inquiry
Matson Liner Lurline Intercepts Coded Japanese Low Radio Frequency Transmissions
12th Naval District Ordered to be on Lookout for Missing Japanese Carrier Force
Intercepted Japanese Message�Attacks to be Launched on Hawaii, Philippines, Malaya and Thailand
Captain Ranneft Sees Wall Map at ONI  Showing Japanese Task Force

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Principal Characters Before and After December 7, 1941

In John Toland's book, Infamy�Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath, pgs. ix - xii, published in 1982, this author found a list of names of the principal characters who occupied key military and civilian positions before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was no doubt a very difficult task to identify all who were involved, and this author is grateful for the effort. Giving credit to John Toland and keyboarding the list onto this web page is an easy task.


U. S. Navy Department

War Department


Hawaiian Department

United States Pacific Fleet

Fourteenth Naval District (Pearl Harbor)

San Francisco

Station M: The U. S. Navy's East Coast Intercept Installation




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Summary of the Attack on December 7, 1941

The credit for the contents under this heading belongs to Don Waterhouse via Richard Waterhouse.

August 3, 2006 Email from Don to this author states:


On Sunday, December 7, 1941 the Japanese launched a surprise attack against the U.S. Forces stationed at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. By planning his attack on a Sunday, the Japanese commander Admiral Nagumo, hoped to catch the entire fleet in port.

As luck would have it, the Aircraft Carriers and one of the Battleships were not in port. (The USS Enterprise was returning from Wake Island, where it had just delivered some aircraft. The USS Lexington was ferrying aircraft to Midway, and the USS Saratoga and USS Colorado were undergoing repairs in the United States.)

In spite of the latest intelligence reports about the missing aircraft carriers (his most important targets), Admiral Nagumo decided to continue the attack with his force of six carriers and 423 aircraft. At a range of 230 miles north of Oahu, he launched the first wave of a two-wave attack. Beginning at 0600 hours his first wave consisted of 183 fighters and torpedo bombers, which struck at the fleet in Pearl Harbor and the airfields in Hickam, Kaneohe and Ewa. The second strike, launched at 0715 hours, consisted of 167 aircraft, which again struck at the same targets.  At 0753 hours the first wave consisting of 40 Nakajima B5N2  "Kate" torpedo bombers, 51 Aichi D3A1 "Val" dive bombers, 50 high altitude bombers and 43 Zeros struck airfields and Pearl Harbor.  Within the next hour, the second wave arrived and continued the attack.

U.S. losses after the attack

    USA: 218 KIA, 364 WIA.
    USN: 2,008 KIA, 710 WIA.
    USMC: 109 KIA, 69 WIA.
    Civilians: 68 KIA, 35 WIA.
    TOTAL: 2,403 KIA, 1,178 WIA.

    USS Arizona (BB-39) - total loss when a bomb hit her magazine.
    USS Oklahoma (BB-37) - Total loss when she capsized and sunk in the harbor.
    USS California (BB-44) - Sunk at her berth. Later raised and repaired.
    USS West Virginia (BB-48) - Sunk at her berth. Later raised and repaired.
    USS Nevada - (BB-36) Beached to prevent sinking. Later repaired.
    USS Pennsylvania (BB-38) - Light damage.
    USS Maryland (BB-46) - Light damage.
    USS Tennessee (BB-43) Light damage.
    USS Utah (AG-16) - (former battleship used as a target) - Sunk.

    USS New Orleans (CA-32) - Light Damage..
    USS San Francisco (CA38) - Light Damage.
    USS Detroit (CL-8) - Light Damage.
    USS Raleigh (CL-7) - Heavily damaged but repaired.
    USS Helena (CL-50) - Light Damage.
    USS Honolulu (CL-48) - Light Damage.

    USS Downes (DD-375) - Destroyed. Parts salvaged.
    USS Cassin - (DD-372) Destroyed. Parts salvaged.
    USS Shaw (DD-373) - Very heavy damage.
    USS Helm (DD-388) - Light Damage.

    USS Ogala (CM-4) - Sunk but later raised and repaired.

Seaplane Tender
    USS Curtiss (AV-4) - Severely damaged but later repaired.

Repair Ship
    USS Vestal (AR-4) - Severely damaged but later repaired.

Harbor Tug
    USS Sotoyomo (YT-9) - Sunk but later raised and repaired.

    188 Aircraft destroyed (92 USN and 92 U.S. Army Air Corps.)

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Japan's Strike Force & Radio Silence

It appears that since Professor Prange's and Captain Beach's books were published another blast to the historical record emerged in 2000 with Robert B. Stinnett's book, Day of Deceit. And because of his seventeen years of extensive research, new government secrets were disclosed which revealed those in the highest military and civilian offices, including the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, knew of the pending attack at Pearl Harbor, having deliberately provoked the incident.

Stinnett writes on page 162 of Day of Deceit that "after sixty years it is clear that the US Navy, the Army, and the press were all wrong. Admiral Yamamoto did send radio messages to the Pearl Harbor force during the eleven-day sortie to Hawaii." He obtained this information from Archives II, University of Maryland at College Park.

[Lieutenant Commander] Joseph Rochefort [Head of Station HYPO, Hawaii] revealed the [Admiral] Nagumo broadcasts directly to Admiral Kimmel in the Communication Summary dated November 25 but delivered to the admiral the next morning: "Commander Carriers [at Hitokappu Bay] was in extensive communications with the submarine commander and Central Pacific Forces."

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Admiral Kimmel Knew Fleet was in Danger

The USS Arizona (BB-39) burning after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
photo and caption credit - Franklin D. Roosevelt Library Public Domain Photographs

Admiral Kimmel and General Short, Navy and Army Commanders at Pearl Harbor, knew where their orders originated. And it appears they knew that President Roosevelt was the originator of the order to ensure that "Japan commit the first overt act [of war]". This may have caused the Commanders to underestimate the strength of the Japanese naval forces en route to Hawaii. The Army and Navy on Hawaii prepared for war by setting up their defenses against saboteurs instead of a surprise air and submarine attack. Kimmel had knowledge of the danger facing the Fleet as recorded on page 164 of Stinnett's Day of Deceit.

After his morning briefing [by Rochefort] on November 25, Admiral Kimmel knew from reading Rochefort's communication summary that a large Japanese force of fleet subs and long-range patrol aircraft was heading eastward toward Hawaii from Japan. Naval doctrine held that the presence of enemy submarines forecast a carrier attack. "If you detect submarines, then look for carriers" was straight out of naval textbooks.

But according to Stinnett on page 166, Rochefort's summary to Station US, and eventually to President Roosevelt, did not contain information about the six carriers of the Japanese First Air Fleet. His 224-word dispatch to Washington closed as follows:

There is believed to be a strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls [the eastward submarine advance in the Central Pacific] which comprise Airron Twenty Four, at least one carrier division unit plus probably one third of the submarine fleet.

Then, fulfilling his promise to reveal Japanese military strategy to his commander, Rochefort closed his dispatch:

Evaluate above to indicate strong force component may be preparing to operate in South Eastern Asia while parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.

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LCdr. Rochefort's Omission About First Fleet's Six Carriers

In Day of Deceit page 166, Stinnett comments on  Rochefort's dispatch to Station US in Washington on November 25, 1941 as follows:

His [Rochefort's] reference to at least one carrier division unit lacks specificity. Kisner's [Chief Radio Intercept Operator] operators at Station H [Hawaii} had previously linked Carrier Divisions Three and Four with the Palao/Mandates region and said both divisions were under the command of the Third Fleet. Another omission can be detected in Rochefort's dispatch: the six carriers of the First Fleet, which were preparing to depart Hitokappu Bay for Hawaii. Earlier that morning [November 25], Kimmel had learned from the Communication Summary that Rochefort had intercepted extensive radio broadcasts between Admiral Nagumo and the submarine force [commander]. At 2:40 P.M., the 224-word dispatch was marked PRIORITY, encoded in a highly secure Navy cipher system, and sent to Station US [Washington]. It arrived in Washington at the office of the Chief of Naval Operations [Admiral Harold Stark] soon after 8:10 P.M. Eastern Standard Time.

Stinnett concludes on page 167 that "the Kimmel-Bloch-Rochefort alert of November 25 is the only intelligence report generated by Station HYPO that can be linked to President Roosevelt."

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LCdr. McCollum's Monograms Missing in Archives II

In Day of Deceit, page 167, Stinnett states that Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum, head of the Far East Desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, took charge of the Japanese naval intercepts and documented them as a series of radio intelligence bulletins, called monograms. According to his numbering system, McCollum had prepared seventy-four radio intelligence monograms  as of December 3, 1941.

Their delivery to the White House was assured when the route slip was check marked, "Aide to the President�Show." Five monograms were marked for FDR's attention between November 26 and December 3 and can be found in Navy files. But sixty-seven in the series are missing�a major concern to National Archives historians Richard A. von Doenhoff and Barry Zerby, who could not locate the documents. We can confirm the monograms are missing from the Navy files but have no explanation for their removal," said von Doenhoff.

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Joseph Persico Describes the Head Spymaster�Not a Conspirator

In 2001, a brilliant military historian and writer, Joseph E. Persico, published Roosevelt's Secret War, FDR and World War II Espionage, which attempts to challenge Stinnett's findings. Persico chooses to falsify several Stinnett's facts and concludes that FDR was not a conspirator and had no knowledge of the pending attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 by the Japanese. Although he fails to challenge a multitude of other Stinnett's findings which claim otherwise. Nevertheless, Persico concludes with his label as factual that the revisionist historian's conspiratorial thesis are "dramatically scripted conspiracies [which] provide high theater, while the truth is often messy, random, illogical, even dull."

 Joseph Persico presented this author a thorough character analysis of President Roosevelt; the man who his closest associates said to have "had a difficult time trying to understand his reasoning processes." He proved to this author that FDR was well suited for the role of leading the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) as their head spymaster. However, those closest to him were of a special breed�the well educated, the rich and the famous. One of these was Rexford Tugwell, an associate from the New Deal era, who thought that FDR "deliberately concealed the processes of his mind." He led the OSS in spying on the war with Germany while he led the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in the war with Japan. Persico's Forward in Roosevelt's Secret War states the following:

Few leaders have been better suited by nature and temperament for the anomalies of secret warfare than FDR. "You know I am a juggler, and I never let my right hand know what my left hand does," he [FDR] once confessed. "I may be entirely inconsistent, and furthermore I am perfectly willing to mislead and tell untruths if it will help me win the war."

And he won both wars with this brand of leadership and kept America free. Although Persico continues to describe FDR's character.

FDR compartmentalized information, misled associates, manipulated people, conducted intrigues, used private lines of communications, scattered responsibility, duplicated assignments, provoked rivalries, held all the cards while showing few, and left few fingerprints. His behavior, which fascinated, puzzled, amazed, dismayed, and occasionally repelled people, parallels many of the qualities of an espionage chief.

Following the brutal attack on Pearl Harbor, and after his first broadcasted radio address to the Nation, and the declaration of war, President Roosevelt realized the importance of holding the leadership of his administration together for a common goal of fighting and winning the war with Japan. There is no doubt that this intelligent man knew there were mistakes made as a result of poor judgment, and some of them were his. And that there were others in Washington and Hawaii who possessed the same realization. But the days after December 7, required a leadership at the highest levels, which was capable of concentrating on winning a war and not searching to place blame.  Reassigning the leadership in Hawaii was considered to be the best first move for the situation facing the country. With time, and hopefully success with the war effort, investigations could follow to answer the failures at Pearl Harbor. This author believes that FDR postponed his "angel of death" until victory was realized on both oceans. Maybe if he would have lived to witness the fruits of victory, we would have seen a sign on his desk with President Truman's favorite quote, "The buck stops here!"

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At Dawn We Slept or ....... & Failed to Defend

So the Fleet and Hawaiian Commanders scheduled a golf date for Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, and the former Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, serving as the Fleet's Battleship Commander spent Saturday, December 6, in his ocean-front residence on the Maui side of Diamond Head, while seven of his battleships were tied up at Ford Island�the target of Japan's air attack�and an eighth on the dry dock. Stinnett provides most of this information on pages 243-244 of Day of Deceit.

To prove that others at lower levels were lulled into complacency by the soothing tropical winds, the Officer in Charge of the locked Ammunition Depot at Pearl Harbor, Lieutenant Commander Lawrence F. Blodgett, went bird hunting in the cane fields adjacent to the Depot with his son on the morning of the attack. A personal letter from LCdr. Blodgett's son, Mr. Laurence Blodgett, on February 8, 2000 verifies this entry�view the letter at

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Court of Inquiry in 1944 Hears Adm. Turner Testify About Source of Vacant Sea Order

On November 17, 1941, US Ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo followed Rochefort's estimates with a prediction sent to Washington that Japan is planning to carry out a sudden military and naval action with its armed forces. Stinnett states on page 144 in Day of Deceit that this alert triggered another astonishing event.

Navy officials declared the North Pacific Ocean a "Vacant Sea" and ordered all US and allied shipping out of the waters. An alternate trans-Pacific route was authorized through the Torres Strait, in the South Pacific between Australia and New Guinea. Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner, War Plans officer for the United States Navy in 1941, explained the reasoning with a startling admission: "We were prepared to divert traffic when we believed the war was imminent. We sent the traffic down via Torres Strait, so that the track of the Japanese task force would be clear of any traffic."

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Navy Department Feud�ONI vs. War Plans

Many senior officers who served as Directors of Naval Intelligence in the Navy Department, Washington, during 1941, have memories of the ongoing feud between ONI and Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Director of War Plans. The ONI Manual stated that ONI was responsible for the evaluation and distribution of naval intelligence to the appropriate agencies, but Admiral Turner thought otherwise. Rear Admiral Edwin Layton in his "And I Was There" page 100 describes Captain Alan Kirk's (DNI) confrontation with Admiral Turner.

Certainly Turner had plenty to conceal. He was vehemently unforgiving of officers who defied him. He continued to harass Kirk as he tried to turn ONI into nothing more than an intelligence drop-box. By May 1941, the increasing interference of war plans in what ONI officers regarded as their prerogative in intelligence matters caused deep resentment. One of the [Turner] fortnightly summaries on which Kirk had handwritten "In my view the Japs will jump pretty soon" had been returned from "coordination" by war plans with the bold scrawl, "I don't think that the Japs are going to jump now or ever! R.K.T."

Such pronouncements vitiated the impact of McCollum's [Head Far East section, ONI] accurate estimates and reveal how Turner tried to dictate strategic intelligence. ONI often found itself in the unenviable position of having no say about enemy intentions, but being accountable if war plans made a wrong evaluation. It left many of those in the junior echelons feeling they had been "robbed" of their main intelligence function�evaluation. The bad blood between the divisions did nothing to encourage the cooperation so essential to the complex function of turning raw data into meaningful intelligence.

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Admiral Turner Testifies Before the Hart Inquiry

Admiral Turner testified under oath on the twentieth day of the Hart Inquiry. The following question and answer is online at

40. Q. Were you, however, surprised that one of the objectives of the Japanese attack was Pearl Harbor itself?

A. Not in the least. I had originated a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War in January of 1941 concerning the defenses of Hawaii, in which an air, sea, and submarine attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor was set forth as one of the most probable forms that the initiation of war with Japan would take. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, about that same time, wrote letters to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commanding General in Hawaii, pointing out these features and asking that steps be taken within the power of those officers to be prepared for such an attack. Those letters were not intended to be construed as indicating an immediate attack, but they attempted to initiate rather long-range preparatory plans.

Admiral McCrea (McC) provides the details concerning the letter of January 1941 from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War . He claims to be the originator, not Turner. And his initials at the top left corner of the first page proves his claim. The War Warnings page on this web site contains photos of the letters and an explanation of their origins.

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Exercise 191�Adm. Kimmel Launches Fleet Sortie into North Pacific

During Kimmel's Fleet briefing on Exercise 191, November 19, 1941, Rear Admiral Walter Anderson�Commander Battleships�filed a written objection to the 600-mile-wide aerial reconnaissance area of the North Pacific because of inadequate aircraft fuel considerations. Stinnett writes in Day of Deceit page 149 that Anderson's objection can be seen as "another move to support Washington's Vacant Sea policy and clear the North Pacific of US aircraft and ships." Kimmel was aware of Anderson's close contacts in Washington, so he concurred with the 600-mile-wide recommendation over Lieutenant Commander C. F. Greber's recommendation that the float planes from the battleships could carry fuel for flights up to 745 miles and extend the range of aerial reconnaissance.

On Sunday, November 23, 1941, Admiral Kimmel and the Pacific Fleet were in the North Pacific on Exercise 191 scouting the waters for Japanese carriers. Stinnett describes this sortie on page 146, Day of Deceit.

The object of the exercise called for Force Black [Japan] to conduct an air raid on Force White [USA]. Exercise 191 would prove eerily similar to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's Operation Order No. 1 which set forth Japan's naval plans for the Hawaii raid. Both Exercise 191 and OPORD 1 called for a Japanese carrier force to advance on Hawaii from the North Pacific in an operational area between 158� and 157� west longitude�the approach to Oahu and Pearl Harbor.

Then on page 147, Kimmel writes that Exercise 191 was not to be an ordinary exercise. All were warned that hostile warships may be discovered. "EASY CAST EASY" was the code phrase chosen if enemy forces were located. The Fleet was ordered to operate on "radio silence" throughout the exercise. Kimmel wanted Navy Headquarters in Washington to know about Exercise 191, so he sent them ten copies of the operational details.

 According to testimony by Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner, Head of War Plans, Washington, naval war planners always contemplated a Japanese carrier raid aimed at Hawaii from the North Pacific. The theory of an attack of this nature was discussed among senior naval officials for at least the prior twenty-five years, as documented by Stinnett in Day of Deceit page 147.

Exercise 191 war games continued into Monday, November 24, as Fleet warships and aircraft chased one another over submerged volcanoes. When suddenly at 3:30 P.M., Kimmel ordered to "Cease Present Exercises", although the schedule called for another fifteen hours. The North Pacific became a Vacant Sea. Kimmel cancelled the exercise after receiving specific action orders from Washington. Rear Admiral Royal Ingersoll, Assistant CNO, warned Kimmel to "expect a surprise aggressive movement by Japan in any direction, but not to place the Pacific Fleet in a position that would precipitate Japanese action." See page 150 Day of Deceit.

On November 25, the day that the Japanese carrier force sailed for Pearl Harbor, Navy headquarters sent the following message to Adm. Kimmel and San Francisco's Twelfth Naval District.

Route all transpacific shipping thru Torres Straits. CINCPAC and CINCAF provide necessary escort.
Refer your dispatch 230258.

The order was dispatched about an hour after Admiral Nagumo's carrier force departed Hitokappu Bay and entered the North Pacific.

If the truth about the source of the Vacant Sea order is recorded here, then an accurate assumption must follow: Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, received the Vacant Sea Order from Navy Secretary Knox and President Roosevelt to clear the way for Japan's First Air Fleet to attack Pearl Harbor without being detected. This action was intended to ensure that Japan commits the first overt act of war. And the Japanese First Air Fleet sailed undetected; the attack on Pearl Harbor proceeded as planned. If the Japanese strike force remained undetected throughout the journey to Pearl Harbor, then there would be no need for Japan to send a Winds Message, which would have signaled a break in diplomatic relations and a subsequent cutoff of international communications.  All intended to automatically trigger the destruction of classified matter and equipment at Japanese embassies and consulates world-wide.

Stinnett's analysis of the Vacant Sea order on page 145, Day of Deceit, is one that this author accepts wholeheartedly.

The Vacant Sea order dramatizes Admiral Kimmel's helplessness in the face of FDR's desires. The admiral tried on a number of occasions to do something to defend Pearl Harbor, based on Rochefort's troubling intercepts. Exactly two weeks prior to the attack, Kimmel ordered a search for a Japanese carrier force north of Hawaii. Without White House approval, he moved the Pacific Fleet into the North Pacific Ocean in the precise area where Japan planned to launch her carrier attack on Pearl Harbor. But his laudable efforts came to naught. When White House military officials learned Kimmel's warships were in the area of what turned out to be the intended Japanese launch site, they issued directives that caused Kimmel to quickly order the Pacific Fleet out of the North Pacific and back to its anchorages in Pearl Harbor.

This unfortunate reversal of direction has been ignored by every Pearl Harbor investigation. It was never discussed during the original series of inquiries held from 1941 to 1946. It escaped scrutiny during the 1995 Congressional probe by Senator Strom Thurmond and Congressman Floyd Spence. Congress opened the 1995 Pearl Harbor probe at the request of Husband Kimmel's surviving family members. But neither Admiral Kimmel nor his family ever mentioned the mysterious sortie and the sudden recall from the North Pacific waters. Yet it provides exculpatory evidence which proves that Kimmel vigorously reconnoitered the waters north of Hawaii. After the attack, Kimmel was accused of failure to conduct precisely this type of reconnaissance.

In Scapegoats page 172, Captain Edward Beach, USN (Ret.) describes Stark's service as CNO under the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, and President Roosevelt.

Admiral Stark once very revealingly stated [apparently to Beach] that his conscience was clear because everything he did was in response to orders from higher authority.

Professor Prange in At Dawn We Slept, page 610, describes another viewpoint to Admiral Stark's service as CNO.

In March 1942 [three months after the attack on Pearl Harbor] the President decided to remove him [Stark] as CNO and send him to London as commander, U. S. Naval Forces in Europe�quite a comedown at the time. Stimson's [Secretary of War] diary indicates that Stark's reassignment was part of the overall shakeup of the Navy. Roosevelt was far from happy with that organization at the time in spite of his usual bias toward the sea service. On March 6, following a Cabinet meeting, Knox [Secretary of the Navy] told Stimson "that he [Roosevelt]  had practically settled his troubles in the Navy. Stark is going to London and Turner [head of War Plans] is going to sea." Stimson congratulated Knox "on these steps forward . . . ."

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Admiral Stark Orders Two Task Forces Out of Pearl Harbor

Admiral Kimmel, Commander of the Pacific Fleet, still wanted to "discover a Japanese carrier force" even after Washington's early cancellation of Exercise 191 to keep him out of the North Pacific. So he approved two of Vice Admiral William "Bull" Halsey's new missions to do the search. One of these was an order issued by Admiral Halsey on November 24, 1941, which included a 25-warship task force to guard against an "enemy air and submarine" attack on Pearl Harbor. The task force was built around the carrier Enterprise and the battleship USS Arizona. Halsey's directive stated that the operation was to be from November 28 to December 5, 1941. This is documented as factual by Stinnett in Day of Deceit on pages 151-154, following verification by the national archives.

On November 26, 1941, two days before Halsey's task force was to depart Pearl Harbor, Kimmel received an order from Admiral Stark, CNO in Washington, directing him to use aircraft carriers and deliver Army pursuit planes to Wake and Midway Islands. So the search for Japanese carriers had to be cancelled, while the Hawaiian and Fleet commanders tried to figure out how to launch army planes from navy carriers. It could not be done. As an alternative, twelve Marine fighter planes with Marine Corps pilots were scheduled for the voyage aboard the USS Enterprise, because these planes could be launched from the deck of the carrier. Admiral Halsey agreed to transport fighter planes to Wake Island and cancel the "look for the enemy" operation. In departure from Hawaii on November 28, the USS Enterprise was escorted by eleven of the fleet's newest warships, leaving the battleship USS Arizona behind.

On December 5, 1941, Rear Admiral John H. Newton departed Pearl Harbor aboard the aircraft carrier, USS Lexington, with Task Force 12 accompanied by eight modern warships. Stinnett states on page 152, Day of Deceit, that according to the deck log, the USS Enterprise was heading for an unnamed "assigned area" with eighteen fighters, [although the Naval Historical Center states that there were 25 scout bombers on deck] originally intended for Midway as described earlier. When Admiral Newton learned of the attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor, shortly after 8:00 A.M. on December 7, he cancelled the delivery of planes.

After considering all that has been written about Admiral Stark on this web page, it's  fair to state as factual that Admiral Stark was following orders which originated with the leadership in the civilian chambers of the administration in Washington, namely, the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and the Office of the President of the United States. As stated earlier on this web page, in Scapegoats page 172, Captain Edward Beach, USN (Ret.) describes Stark's service as CNO under the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, and President Roosevelt.

Admiral Stark once very revealingly stated [apparently to Beach] that his conscience was clear because everything he did was in response to orders from higher authority.

Of utmost importance, it must be remembered that those who were cleared to work on top secret/secret matters dealing with Magic�the decrypted Japanese diplomatic messages from the Purple machine�in the Navy Department under Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark and in the War Department  under Army  Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, were required to "sign a paper never to disclose it, practically as long as he lived, or ever to talk about it." And many took their secrets to the grave, including Admiral Stark. There existed an impasse on the full truth about Pearl Harbor during the eight investigations between December 18, 1941 and July 14, 1946. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), authored by the late U.S. Congressman John Moss (D., CA), and enacted in 1966, opened the door for the public to a multitude of government diplomatic and military secrets. 

Stinnett knew who ordered the two task forces out of Pearl Harbor, days prior to December 7, with his entries on pages 152 and 153, in Day of Deceit.

On orders from Washington, Kimmel left his oldest vessels inside Pearl Harbor and sent twenty-one modern warships, including his two aircraft carriers, west toward Wake and Midway. Those were strange orders, for they dispatched American forces directly into the path of the oncoming fleet of thirty submarines. The last-minute circumstances that moved the warships out of Pearl Harbor were discussed during the 1945-46 Congressional inquiry. Members wondered whether the sorties were genuine efforts to reinforce Wake Island and Midway or merely ploys to move all the modern warships from the Pearl Harbor anchorages prior to the attack so they would not be hit by the First Air Fleet.

Senator Alben Barkley, the Chairman, questioned Admiral Stark about the sortie of the two carrier forces.

Barkley: "It is not clear in my mind whether they [two carrier forces] were sent."
Stark: "Yes, sir; they were sent. The dates were set by Admiral Kimmel. We gave no specific dates."

Stinnett writes in Day of Deceit that Stark stumbled over the facts: he set the date, not Kimmel. According to Navy records, Stark set the date on November 26 with the following dispatch:

it will be necessary for you to transport these planes and grounds crew from oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier.

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FDR's Secret Map Room in the White House

President Roosevelt created a secret map room in the White House when he learned about the one Prime Minister Churchill had in London, {photo below}.  Churchill brought a portable version of it with him and had it installed in the Monroe Room of the White House. FDR's new naval aide, Captain John L. McCrea, became the first officer in charge of the map room, having served formally as the naval aide to Admiral Stark.

Churchill's Map Room�Compliments of the Online Churchill  Museum

The Churchill map room in London came into use on the very first day that the Cabinet War Rooms were ready for occupation and never ceased to be the hub of the whole site until VJ Day. Quietly closed down the next day, 16 August 1945, it was left almost exactly as we see it today, every book, map, chart, pin and notice occupying the same position now that they occupied then. The walls are pasted with large scale maps of the Atlantic, the seas around the United Kingdom and Far Eastern theatres of war including maps showing the island-hopping operations by the American sea-borne forces in the Pacific.

On page 160 of Roosevelt's Secret War, Persico describes Churchill's comments concerning FDR's fascination with the portable map room.

He [FDR] liked to come and study attentively the large maps of all the theatres of war which soon covered the walls, and on which the movement of fleets and armies was so swiftly and accurately recorded.

On page 161, Roosevelt's Secret War, Persico documents McCrea's assignment.

McCrea attacked the President's order for a map room with zeal. He expropriated a ladies room on the first floor of the White House ideally located across from the elevator the President used to reach the Oval Office and next to the room occupied by the President's physician, Admiral McIntire, whom FDR saw almost daily. Within days of Churchill's departure, the map room was functioning. Blowups of maps papered the walls from floor to ceiling.

The President used the map room to follow the course of the Wars in the Atlantic and Pacific. FDR was the Commander in Chief, and he took his job seriously. The United States Navy was "His Navy."

What Persico did not realize in his documentation of President Roosevelt's Map Room was the quantity and type of "map room messages" stored there, which contained communications between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt between 1939 and 1945. They were categorized, microfilmed and made available online as stated below. Reel 1 contains a list of messages exchanged between Roosevelt and Churchill and mailed from the Map Room in the White House, long before McCrea hung maps on the walls in early 1942. Two pertinent pages located online as .pdf files were scanned and added herein.

Map Room Messages of President Roosevelt, 1939-1945

This microfilm collection consists of nine reels. It focuses on the communications between the allied leaders during World War II mailed from the Map Room in the White House. The first six reels are concerned with messages between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. Reel seven involves communications between Roosevelt and Stalin. Messages between Roosevelt and Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek, and between FDR and the American ambassadors in Russia, China, and Great Britain can be found in reels 8 and 9.

Scanned photos of the Index of Reel 1 map room messages, which includes the microfilm frame numbers of each message exchanged between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in 1941, are included herein.

Map Room Messages of President Roosevelt (1939 - 1945)

Charles Lutton included his observations concerning the messages exchanged between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt from British research and documentation. His entry with the Institute for Historical Review entitled Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy is online at It contains a separate discussion under the heading "The Role of Winston Churchill". The following extract reveals Churchill's attempts to get the U. S. into World War II.

Students of the Second World War are well aware that Roosevelt and Churchill were working together long before the United States was officially at war against the Axis. The Tyler Kent affair has shed light on the secret communications the two engaged in, even before Churchill was Prime Minister. British wartime Cabinet papers released in January 1972 disclosed that at the August 1941 Newfoundland, Canada meeting, where the "Atlantic Charter" was announced, Roosevelt promised Churchill that the U.S. would enter the war by the end of the year.

Questions have persisted: Did Churchill know about the Japanese design against Pearl Harbor? Did he pass along what information he had to Roosevelt? [emphasis added]

At the Ninth International Revisionist Conference, British historian David Irving dealt with these and related matters in his paper, "Churchill and U.S. Entry into World War II," which was subsequently published in The IHR, Volume Nine, Number Three, Fall 1989, pp. 261-286. While working on the second volume of his wartime biography of Churchill, Irving reported that he discovered that all British intelligence files relating to Japan during the fall of 1941 have been removed from the archives and are closed to review by researchers. His fellow British historian, John Costello, was told by the British Ministry of Defence that it is "not in the national interest" to have these files made available to the public.

In his remarks, Irving pointed out that from September 1939 the British were able to read the Japanese fleet operational code, known as JN-25 (Japanese Navy). He went on to reveal that by mid-November of 1941, Churchill knew that the United States was soon to be attacked by the Japanese and that he "probably knew" that an attack would fall at Pearl Harbor. Said Irving, "I think Churchill deliberately allowed the attack on Pearl Harbor to go ahead in order to bring the Americans in. He did everything to avoid having the Pacific Fleet warned."

This thesis has been developed by James Rusbridger and Eric Nave in their newly released book, Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into WW II (New York: Summit Books, Simon & Schuster, 302 pp., photographs, index, 1991, $19.95. ISBN: 0-671-70805-8). Rusbridger, formerly with Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, has written on intelligence and military history since his retirement. While doing work on a book dealing with signals intelligence, he encountered Captain Eric Nave, "the father of British codebreaking in the Far East." The two then collaborated to produce this volume, which discloses that the British, and very likely the Americans, too, were indeed reading the Japanese Navy operational code well before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

By their account, the British certainly knew that the Japanese fleet was going to set sail on November 26, 1941. [Also the same date the Vacant Sea order was sent to the Pacific Fleet and others.] The most likely targets were the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Singapore, or Pearl Harbor. When the Japanese were not sighted in the south, this was, by process of elimination, a further indication that they were sending units towards Pearl Harbor. On December 2, five days before the attack on Hawaii, the British intercepted Admiral Yamamoto's signal, "Climb Niitakayama 1208," meaning that an attack would commence on December 8, Tokyo time, which was December 7 in Hawaii.

They charge that Churchill must have known that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked, but that he refused to pass his information to Roosevelt. Had FDR known about the impending Japanese first-strike, then "as a totally honorable President," he would have warned Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor. They conclude their narrative:

Roosevelt was thus deceived by Churchill, who took a ghastly gamble to bring America into the war in a manner that would sweep aside all opposition; and he was also badly served by his own divided and jealous subordinates. The combination of the two brought a reluctant ally into the war. Churchill's gamble paid off even if, in the process, Britain lost an empire.

Anyone familiar with the Roosevelt record can see the flaw in their conclusion, even if they are correct that the JN-25 code had been broken by the early fall of 1939. The authors completely misread Roosevelt's position. They make no mention of his commitments to the British and Dutch [if the Japanese forces passed the line 100 East and 10 North, and were thought to be heading toward Dutch territory as well as the Kra Peninsula and Thailand, the Dutch were expecting the U. S. Navy to offer assistance] , and the dilemma he was placed in when the Dutch called on the U.S. to own up to its part of the bargain four days before the attack on Pearl Harbor. There is no reference to Roosevelt's "live bait" ploy of sending three little ships out of Manila on a "defensive information patrol" the week before Pearl Harbor. Greaves, and others, long ago argued that while FDR may not have welcomed the loss of life at Pearl Harbor, that after the failure of his "three little ships" gambit, and with the Dutch and British invoking their agreements that went into effect after the Japanese crossed the imaginary line in Southeast Asia, the attack on Pearl Harbor solved Roosevelt's most pressing problem.

Rusbridger and Nave have undoubtedly uncovered additional parts of the mystery. With the reservations I have out lined, their book is of interest to students of this episode.

Viewers of this web page are invited to join the research effort and contact the Roosevelt Study Center in the Netherlands concerning access to the messages exchanged between Churchill and Roosevelt in 1941. There is a possibility that a next-generation historian/researcher, who can afford to travel to the Netherlands, will locate a message which answers the question, "Did either Churchill or Roosevelt know that a Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was to occur on December 7, 1941?"

Contact this author at my email address if you desire to share a new discovery.

During World War I, President Roosevelt was the Assistant Secretary of the US Navy.  This meant he played a key role in naval tactics and operations, including the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).  WWI would have at least some influence on the rest of his life, and his conduct during World War II.  During WWI, FDR had to approve strategies to counter the German Submarine Strategies. And it appears that he used US naval strategies to counter the movements by the Japanese Navy.

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Matson Liner Lurline Intercepts Coded Japanese Low Radio Frequency Transmissions

The luxury liner Lurline was at sea with passengers on a voyage from California to Hawaii on November 30, 1941 when her first assistant radio operator, Leslie E. Grogan, one of the most experienced radio operators of the Matson Line, recorded that he picked up a faint signal which he could not identify. The direction of the signal was from northwest by west�considered to be a peculiar area for traffic that time of the year.

On pgs. 278 - 280, Infamy�Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath, John Toland provides a detailed explanation of the source of this signal�Station JCS, Yokohama, Japan�copied on and off from November 30 to December 2. Grogan documented the results of his endeavors in the ship's journal, allowing this author to benefit from his efforts.

The Japs are blasting away on the lower Marine Radio frequency�it is all in the Japanese code, and continues for several hours. Some of the signals were loud, and others weak, but in most every case, the repeat-back was acknowledged verbatum [sic]. It appears to me that the Jap is not using any deception of "Signal Detection" and boldly blasts away, using the Call letters JCS and JOS, and other Japanese based stations that have their transmitting keys all tied-in together, and controlled from a common source, presumably Tokio [sic]. . . .

So much of the signal reaching us on the SS Lurline were good enough to get good R.D.F. [Radio Direction Finding Bearings]. We noted that signals were being repeated back, possibly for copying by crafts with small antennas. The main body of signals came from a Northwest by West area, which from our second night from Los Angeles bound for Honolulu�would be North and West of Honolulu.

Having crossed the Pacific for 30 years, never heard JCS Yokohama Japan before at 9 P.M. our time on the lower Marine Frequency, and then rebroadcast simultaneously on the lower Marine frequency from some point in the Pacific.

If anyone should ask me, I would say it's the Jap's Mobilization Battle Order. Rudy Asplund kept Captain Berndtson [the ship's master] informed and presume the Bridge Officers must have thought us "Nuts" with so much D.F. Tracking down of signals.

It is now 3AM and am trying to cool off after that hectic session earlier.

Have jotted down all the particulars as they present themselves, and it is my desire to make a record of this because [I] sense things! Might prove worthy, who knows? GM 3.30 [sic] AM Dec. 1, 1941.

Yes Mr. Grogan, you did sense correctly. Hope your family and kin find time to view this web site and note that this author appreciates your effort to help zero-in on the truth about the attack on Pearl Harbor. (Just checked the Social Security Death Index and discovered that Leslie Grogan of Daly City, California, was born on November 14, 1894 and died in August 1974�may he rest in peace knowing his contribution to the history of a free nation has been recognized.)

On the night of Monday, December 1,  the Japanese signals were once more intercepted.

Again Rudy and I pick up without any trouble all the Japanese coded Wireless signals like last night�it goes on for two hours like before, and we are now making a concise record to turn in to the Naval Intelligence when we arrive in Honolulu, Wednesday December 3rd, 1941.

On Tuesday night, December 2nd, the signals became even stronger as Kido Butai drew closer to its target.

We continue to pick up the bold Japanese General Order signals�it can't be anything else. We get good Radio Direction Finder bearings, mostly coming from a Northwesterly direction from our position. The Jap floating units continue their bold repetition of wireless signals, presumably for the smaller crafts in their vanguard of ships, etc. The Japanese shore stations JCS and JOS are keyed by remote tie-in, coming from Tokyo I presume, and if we had a recording device, it would only prove what we ourselves jot down, and we can't help but know that so much of it is a repeat back, letter for letter, because we have copied the original signals coming from Japanese land based stations, etc.

The Japs are so bold in using these low Marine frequencies too, but with all the tension we've seen up to now, it's safe to say something is going to happen, and mighty soon, but how soon? All this display means something�time will tell, and tonights  [sic] Radio Detection signals have come from a NW by W from Honolulu, and from the signals, the Japs must be bunched up, biding time.

At 9:00 A.M. on December 3, 1941, the USS Lurline docked at its usual pier near Honolulu's famous Aloha Tower, as stated by Toland on Pg. 285.

Grogan and Asplund hurried the few blocks up Bishop Street to the downtown intelligence office of the Fourteenth Naval District in the Hotel Alexander Young Building. After introducing themselves to Lieutenant Commander George Warren Pease, they turned over the data. Pease promised to pass on the warning but there is no record that he forwarded the information either to the Fourteenth Naval District intelligence officer, Captain Irving Mayfield, or to Washington.

Pease was killed in an air crash in 1945.

Enter Robert Stinnett with your findings published on pgs. 197 - 198 in Day of Deceit and tell us "the rest of the story." What observations did Leslie Grogan make when he delivered his report to Pease?

Pease was a good listener but showed little outward reflection as to what we felt was a mighty serious situation.

From here on, Stinnett describes his search for the truth concerning Grogan's report.

If Pease ever submitted a report on the Lurline's locating Japanese warships north of Hawaii by RDF, it has disappeared. So has the Lurline's original radio log. On December 10, the liner returned to San Francisco and Lieutenant Commander Preston Allen boarded the ship and confiscated the radio log. Allen, a member of the Twelfth Naval District intelligence unit, took the log containing the details of Grogan's interceptions to his District office. It has never been seen since. Grogan's account, quoted in this book [Day of Deceit] is based on a reconstruction of the missing log that he prepared for Matson Lines after Allen took possession of the log.

During research for this [log] book, the author [Stinnett] uncovered details of the Lurline log's disappearance. In the late 1970s, shortly after John Toland began research for his book [Infamy�Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath], he filed an FOIA [Freedom of Information Act request] with the Navy asking to see the log. The Navy said there was no record of such a log, but a withdrawal slip in the National Archives, San Bruno, California, tells another story. After he took possession of the log, Lieutenant Commander Allen did not return it to Matson Lines. Instead he filed it in the voluminous records of the Port Director, Twelfth Naval District. There it remained, unknown to all Pearl Harbor investigations. In 1958, the Port Director files were turned over to the Federal Records Center [FRC] in San Bruno, a division of the National Archives.

Sometime in the 1970s someone removed the log from the National Archives and left a withdrawal slip form in its place. The caption on the slip refers to the Lurline's radio log, but it is not dated or signed�a possible felony violation of National Archives procedures. "It had to be someone connected with the Navy," said Kathleen O'Conner, who discovered the withdrawal slip in August 1991. O'Conner, an archivist at San Bruno, told the author [Stinnett] that the white withdrawal slip is yellowed, indicating deterioration based on a storage period of about twenty years�from about the time that Toland made his FOIA request. At the time the Lurline's log was in the physical custody of the Center but under the legal control of the Navy. The FRC is a government records center where both temporary and permanent Federal records are kept. Permanent records are eventually transferred to the National Archives' custody and opened for public access. Most FRC records are not opened for public inspection. "Only naval personnel had access," explained O'Conner.

She noted the "curious coincidence" of the above events. "Every federal regulation pertaining to the care and preservation of archival documents was neglected," O'Conner said. "There is no date of withdrawal, nor any signature of the person who removed these highly significant records."

It is evident that a reconstruction of the missing Lurline radio log by Leslie Grogan is the only way the above information could have been published by Stinnett in Day of Deceit. The 17th footnote for Chapter 12 in Day of Deceit explains how Stinnett obtained a copy.

See Leslie Grogan's reconstructed Lurline log dated December 10, 1941. The Matson Navigation Company, San Francisco furnished copy to author [Stinnett]. Grogan reconstructed the log after Navy [Lieutenant Commander Preston Allen, Twelfth Naval District in San Francisco] seized the original on December 10, 1941. Grogan did not list or define the "lower marine frequency in the reconstructed log." Grogan died August 4, 1974.

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12th Naval District Ordered to be on Lookout for Missing Japanese Carrier Force

There is a distinct possibility that Leslie Grogan aboard the Lurline was not the only one to copy the unusual transmissions on the lower marine frequencies�the Japanese navy's four-megacycle radio band of 4000 kilocycles. On pgs. 189 - 196, Day of Deceit, Stinnett documents the activities which took place at the intercept facility of the Twelfth Naval District in San Francisco.

 Over the November 28-30 weekend, US Navy facilities were told to be on the lookout for the Japanese carrier force. About Sunday November 30, according to [Robert] Ogg, [on the staff of the Twelfth Naval District intelligence office as a special investigator], commercial radio firms supplied [Lieutenant Ellsworth A.] Hosmer with RDF bearings that placed Japanese warships in the North Pacific. The report of vessels in the North Pacific surprised Ogg and Hosmer, for both were aware of the Vacant Sea orders. Ogg said the RDF bearings that he plotted were obtained from the Japanese navy's four-megacycle radio band of 4000 kilocycles.

On pg. 191, Day of Deceit, Stinnett shows a nautical chart, which was reconstructed by Robert Ogg in 1987. With a magnifying glass, it is possible to see all of the key points Ogg plotted and Stinnett described in the vertical caption on the same page. The short, dark, vertical line located in the lower center of the chart and labeled 12/6 shows the location of the Japanese carrier force in position to strike Pearl Harbor, Oahu. The large, dark line in the center of the chart shows the positions of the Japanese carrier force on 11/30, 12/1, 12/2, and 12/3. For those who do not have a copy of Day of Deceit, this author considers Ogg's nautical chart of utmost importance in the search for the truth about Pearl Harbor and encourages the viewer to obtain a copy and read Chapter 12�The Japs Are Blasting Away On The Frequencies.

Stinnett continues the documentation of this subject on pgs. 193 -196.

According to Ogg, Hosmer identified the radio transmissions as Japanese, since the vessels used the unique kana telegraphic code of Japan's navy. He [Hosmer] was certain that the radio signals did not originate with American or Allied vessels, for there were none at sea in the area.

[However, when deposed by Commander Newman, Ogg was not sure whether such transmissions were Japanese or Russian. This statement is credited to "A Navy Cryptologic Veteran's Review of Day of Deceit, November 25, 1999 by Philip H. Jacobsen (San Diego). Read the entire review on the Book Reviews page of this web site.]

Two separate bearings were obtained. One took off from north of San Francisco, the other south. When Ogg traced the two bearings on his chart they intersected in the North Pacific, north of Hawaii. Hosmer was sure that the bearings plotted by Ogg had located warships heading for Hawaii.

Captain Richard McCullough, the [Twelfth Naval] District Intelligence Officer, sent these findings in a report to the Navy Department [Washington]. Most likely it was sent in the GUPID system, which had been assigned to [Vice] Admiral [John] Greenslade for supersecret contact with Station US [Navy, Washington] and [Commander] Arthur McCollum [Head Far East Section ONI]. As this book went to press in 1999, censorship prevented a look at the GUPID system. In 1946 the Joint Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack was asked to delete all reference of GUPID from the official record of the investigation by the Chief Assistant Counsel Gerhard A. Gesell.

Once received in the nation's capital, the Japanese warships locations were delivered to President Roosevelt in the White House, according to district intelligence chief McCullough.

In 1984, all original Japanese intercept records of the Pacific Theater were classified TOP SECRET CODEWORD and held in the custody of the Naval Security Group Command in Washington. The author's (Stinnett) requests to the Navy to see the 4000-kilocycle records of Dutch Harbor for November and December 1941 were turned down. Navy historians George W. Henriksen and Commander Irwin Newman told the author that there were no such records in the NSGC files.

Trying a different tack, the author (Stinnett) learned of a Navy radio direction finder station at Dutch Harbor known as Station KING, which was a unit of Rochefort's Mid-Pacific Direction Finder Network in 1941. Since KING came under the administration of the Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District in Seattle, the author checked with the National Archives and in October of 1985 discovered the 4000-kilocycle Dutch Harbor reports. They irrefutably confirm Ogg's intercept details. According to a secret report issued in November 1941 by Chief Radioman Robert Fox, the traffic chief for KING, the Akagi (Japanese carrier) was heard on 4960 kilocycles in tactical communication with several merchant vessels. Fox wrote that the broadcasts were transmitted on a rarely used Japanese naval radio frequency, but did not list the date. The records of Station H (Navy, Oahu) provided the last piece in the puzzle and revealed that Hawaii (Oahu) also intercepted an Akagi broadcast on November 26, when the carrier used 4963 kilocycles.

The series of intercepted Japanese broadcasts centering in the North Pacific have been overlooked by every Pearl Harbor investigation. They are described here for the first time. Each report is compelling evidence for Ogg's assertions. As of December 3, the number of Japanese warship broadcasts in the North Pacific was significant. In addition to the Hosmer-Ogg source, five Navy listening posts�Stations ITEM (Imperial Beach, CA), CAST (Corregidor), H (Oahu), KING (Dutch Harbor, Alaska) and SAIL (Seattle)�and a Matson liner, the SS Lurline, heard the broadcasts and placed the information in the intelligence pipeline intended for the White House. This vital information obtained by the five units was logged in official Navy reports and forwarded to Washington, but was withheld from Admiral Kimmel and the Pacific Fleet. CAST's identification of the carriers and of Admiral Yamamoto occurred at the same time as and parallels the reports given to Hosmer.

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Intercepted Japanese Message�Attacks to be Launched on
Hawaii, Philippines, Malaya and Thailand

This very important topic comes to life in John Toland's InfamyPearl Harbor and Its Aftermath published in 1982. This author was only able to locate one reference to support Toland's entry on pgs. 281 - 282 concerning the intercepted Japanese message�Long Days Journey into War by Stanley Weintraub, published in 1991; there may be others. Toland's book contains a caption and a photo of General Elliott Thorpe pictured with General McArthur. The caption describes General Thorpe's efforts to warn Washington of the Netherlands East Indies Army (Dutch Army) in Bandoeng, Java, intercept of a Japanese message in consular code from Tokyo to their ambassador in Thailand. The message told of "attacks to be launched on Hawaii, the Philippines, Malaya and Thailand."

The caption for this photo of Generals Thorpe and Mac Arthur was credited to Thorpe, with hardly any reference to the photo it accompanies.

General Thorpe (pictured here with Mac Arthur [center] in 1945) transmitted the full information [the Japanese intercept] from [General Hein] Ter Poorten [commander of the Netherlands East Indies Army] to Washington. There is no record that this, or a second message, was ever received. No one ever admitted seeing them. A few days later Thorpe sent a third message through the American counsel [Dr. Walter Foote, counsel general, in Batavia], but the latter omitted mentioning the location of the attacks and added that he "attached little or no importance" to the intercept. Thorpe sent out a fourth message a few days before the attack, which was acknowledged in Washington [Army G-2, General Miles]. He was ordered to send no more dispatches on the subject. The fourth message was found in War Department files, but the paragraph warning of the Hawaii attack was, curiously, deleted in transmission. (General Elliott Thorpe)

This author ponders the reason why the above caption does not mention the "winds" code setup, since Toland does on pg. 281.

The signal to begin all operations simultaneously would come from Tokyo in the form of a weather broadcast over Radio Tokyo. It was the "winds" code setup.

There is a distinct possibility that when Toland was doing research in the 1970s, he discovered that General Thorpe was alive in his 80s and residing in Florida. Toland may have been the first to locate the information concerning the intercepted Japanese message cited in this topic.

 On pg. 281 - 282, Toland states that the commander of the Dutch Army, General Hein Ter Poorten, hand-carried the long intercepted Japanese message to the next building where the American military observer, Brigadier General Elliott Thorpe, had an office. After General Thorpe read the message he said, "Sir, this is so important that with your permission I will go at once to Batavia and inform our senior State Department representative of this and then send it directly to Washington tonight." Permission was granted, and Thorpe was on his way to alert Washington. Little did he know that there were others with goals to squelch his mission.

Toland's Infamy�Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath�was published in 1982. Brigadier General Elliott R. Thorpe, USA (Ret.), 91, died on June 27, 1989 in Sarasota, Florida. His obituary was published in the New York Times Regional Newspapers on June 29, 1989. Hopefully, we are closer to the truth with knowledge of this intercept. Viewers seeking more information are encouraged to read Toland's Chapter Fourteen�The Tracking of Kido Butai November 26�December 6.

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Captain Ranneft Sees Wall Map at ONI  Showing Japanese Task Force

It appears that neither Robert Stinnett, Day of Deceit, nor John Toland, Infamy�Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath, recorded any information on the role Commander John L. McCrea played when he first served as aide to Admiral Stark and later as naval aide to President Roosevelt and his "map room."

McCrea was able to set up maps for FDR in the White House map room, because he was privy to the maps he saw at the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in the Navy Department. McCrea was able to keep FDR's maps up-to-date from information acquired from intelligence officers at ONI.

On pgs. 282 - 283, Infamy�Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath, Toland documents the fact that on December 2, 1941, Captain Johan E. M. Ranneft, Netherlands naval attach�font> in Washington, visited ONI and queried Admiral Wilkinson, Chief, Intelligence Division, and other intelligence officers "about the deteriorating situation in the Pacific."

Ranneft was startled when one of the Americans pointed to a map on the wall and said, "This is the Japanese Task Force proceeding east." The position was halfway between Japan and Hawaii. Ranneft said nothing, only wondered how the Americans had managed to track the missing carriers. He called Dutch naval headquarters in London and also reported the information in person to (Netherlands) Minister Alexander Loudon. Then he wrote in his official diary, "Conference at Navy Department, O. N. I. They show me on the map the position of two Japanese carriers. They left Japan on easterly course."

If the words spoken "Japanese Task Force", refers to the two carriers recorded in the diary, this could be representative of the entire Japanese Strike Force, the First Air Fleet (Kido Butai), or it may refer to Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2, or only one division with its two aircraft carriers? What is important is that when carriers are on the move, there are many supportive combat vessels (cruisers, destroyers and submarines) nearby or at least within range of radio communications. And a Japanese easterly movement of combat vessels in the Pacific has only a few destinations to choose.

Toland continues on the same subject with a discussion which was taking place  between two very concerned naval officers at Pearl Harbor.

(Admiral) Kimmel was asking his intelligence officer the whereabouts of the missing carriers. Lieutenant Commander Layton reported that there were a few carriers in Japanese home waters but the major force was still missing.

"What!" exclaimed Kimmel. "You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?"
"No sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I don't know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location."

Then Kimmel looked at Layton as he occasionally did�with a somewhat stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eyes�and said, "Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?"
(Layton) "I hope they would be sighted before now."

According to Toland on pg. 284, the information given to Captain Ranneft by ONI was never sent to Kimmel. On December 2, 1941, Kimmel wrote Admiral Stark that the Pacific Fleet was so deficient in auxiliaries that it could not even start any attack west from Pearl Harbor before February of 1942.

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FDR's Naval Strategy to Counter the Movements of the Japanese Navy

Since Admiral Turner testified under oath before a naval Court of Inquiry that a Vacant Sea order was issued to clear the North Pacific Ocean "so that the track of the Japanese task force would be clear of any traffic." And Stinnett's discovery in Day of Deceit that Admiral Stark sent a dispatch to Admiral Kimmel on November 26, 1941 to route sea traffic out of the North Pacific Ocean based on orders from President Roosevelt [according to Stark's admission as published by Beach in Scapegoats] on the very same day that the Japanese First Air Fleet departed from Hitokappu Bay. An obvious deduction from the above facts is that President Roosevelt knew that six Japanese carriers and their compliment of warships were en route in the North Pacific Ocean with an eastward heading toward Hawaii.

There is no doubt in this author's mind that President Roosevelt realized that his Pacific Fleet was in extreme danger in Pearl Harbor and on November 26, 1941 directed Admiral  Stark to send a dispatch to Admiral Kimmel to detail two task forces to sea to deliver planes to Midway and Wake Islands. Naturally this order required the fleet's two aircraft carriers, USS Lexington and USS Enterprise, together with their escorts of cruisers and destroyers, to make the deliveries. The newest warships made the list to depart Pearl Harbor. Most of the other ships were relics of World War I; they remained in harbor.

Located online at is Charles Lutton's 23-page contribution to the Institute for Historical Review with his Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy revealing some interesting facts which were initially presented by Dr. Harry Elmer Barnes as an entire issue of Left and Right: A Journal of Libertarian Thought (Volume IV, 1968). It has since been reprinted in its entirety by the Institute for Historical Review.

Dr. Barnes discussed:

FDR's December 1, 1941 order to Admiral Hart at Manila, ordering the immediate dispatch of three "small vessels" armed with a machine gun and deck cannon, each commanded by a U. S. Naval officer, and flying the American flag. The three little ships were directed to sail into the path of Japanese Navy convoys that Washington knew were then steaming southward.

Had the American ships been attacked by the Japanese, Barnes was confident that this would have saved Pearl Harbor. The enemy would have fired the first shot and the U. S. would have grounds to declare war on Japan.

There can be little doubt that the Cockleship [three small vessels] plan of December 1st was designed to get the indispensable attack by a method which would precede the Pearl Harbor attack, avert the latter, and save the Pacific Fleet and American lives.

Lutton continued with "additional pieces of the puzzle" as presented online at

In the October 1962 issue of the United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Rear Admiral Kemp Tolley gave his account of having been the commander of one of the "little ships" hastily ordered out of Manila to monitor the Japanese Navy in early December of 1941. Although the bare essentials of the incident had been revealed during the Joint Congressional Hearings, Tolley's article sparked much comment. Additional research resulted in the publication of his book, The Cruise of the Lanikai: Incitement to War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973).

The Lanikai was a 67-ton two-masted auxiliary schooner engaged in inter-island traffic. Chartered for $1.00 by the U.S. Navy, it had a crew of five Filipino civilians, who could not speak English. Commander Harry Slocum informed a startled Lt. Tolley that "the President has personally ordered" him to set sail as soon as possible. The sailing ship was turned into a vessel of war by lashing to its deck an old 3-pounder gun left over from the Spanish-American War and two World-War I-vintage .30 caliber machine guns. The only radio available could receive messages but not transmit them. Nevertheless, he was ordered to sail for the coast of Indo-China and told to have someone work on the radio set while they were at sea.

In the event, neither the Lanikai, nor the other ships ordered out, the Isabel and the Molly Moore, were able to cross the paths of the Japanese [emphasis added by author]. Only after the war did Tolley fully appreciate the role intended for the Lanikai -- that of "live bait."

On December 1, 1941, did President Roosevelt realize that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was not the best strategy? The three "little ships" appear to have been his hope that the southern-sailing Japanese convoy would "fire the first shot" giving him justification to try to win the hearts and minds of the American people and go to war. He may have realized the devastation that fighter and dive-bomber aircraft from six carriers, backed up by torpedo- carrying submarines, could create. The sacrifice may have been considered to be too great.

The three "little ships" failed to cross the path of the Japanese convoy, and the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was carried out.

Keeping in mind that Admiral Turner under oath before a naval Court of Inquiry stated that " a Vacant Sea order was issued to clear the North Pacific Ocean so that the track of the Japanese task force would be clear of any traffic". And this order originated with President Roosevelt and passed down to Admiral Stark.

Charles Lutton extracted relevant information to conclude this heading from an appendix added to Professor Prange's At Dawn We Slept by Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon.

In truth, about the only genuinely "untold" aspect of this story [At Dawn We Slept] was that Prange had failed to get his book ready in the early 1950s, when it would have been "new." Shortly before At Dawn We Slept was at long last on its way to the printers, the Carter Administration released a mountain of previously classified U.S. naval records to the National Archives. Prange's literary heirs [Goldstein and Dillon] did not have the time to sift through this massive volume of new material. However, this did not stop them from adding, as an appendix, an essay entitled, "Revisionists Revisited," in which they made the astounding claim to have made a thorough search "including all publications released up to May 1, 1981." While allowing that "the President made his mistakes in 1941, as did almost everyone else involved in Pearl Harbor," they went on to make the mendacious assertion that, "we have not discovered one word of sworn testimony that substantiates the revisionist position on Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor."

This author is neither a guardian of current history on Pearl Harbor or a revisionist historian, the fact remains that Admiral Turner's sworn testimony before a naval Court of Inquiry concerning the Vacant Sea order "substantiates the revisionist position on Roosevelt and Pearl Harbor." Yes, the President, Admiral Stark, and Admiral Turner did make some mistakes in 1941. And Turner and Stark were transferred from Washington within a few months following the attack on Pearl Harbor, while the President stayed on as Commander-in-Chief.

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Defenders of History & Revisionists are Wrong�Leaders in Washington & Hawaii at Fault

There is sufficient information on this single page to state that our country's leadership in Washington and the Commanders at Pearl Harbor were responsible for their failures to properly defend Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. And this web site will attempt to show that both the guardians of current history and the revisionist historians are correct with their theories. Prange, Toland, Beach, Stinnett, Persico and Morgenstern have a passion and a motive to defend their separate conclusions�this author has no sponsors and therefore can accepts their findings and benefit from them. However, their most obvious lesson is that all parties at the highest military and civilian levels used poor judgment at times and were derelict in the performance of their duties.

Following the death of President Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, the end of the war in Europe in early May 1945, and the end of war with Japan on September 2, 1945, a US Congressional hearing, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, was held from November 15, 1945 to May 31, 1946.  All members were in office under FDR's administration: six Democrats�which includes the Chairman and the Vice Chairman�represented the majority party, and four Republicans represented the minority party. Final reports were issued by both parties.  The names and titles of the committee members follows.

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Democrat Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Democrat Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Democrat Senator from Georgia
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Democrat Senator from Illinois
OWEN BREWSTER, Republican Senator from Maine
HOMER FERGUSON, Republican Senator from Michigan
J. BAYARD CLARK, Democrat Representative from North Carolina
JOHN W. MURPHY, Democrat Representative from Pennsylvania
BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Republican Representative from California
FRANK B. KEEFE, Republican Representative from Wisconsin

After seventy days and a record of 10 million words, a minority report by Senators Ferguson and Brewster dismissed the majority report by Senator Alben Barkley as "illogical, and unsupported by the preponderance of the evidence."  After reading the majority and minority reports, this author places more credibility on the minority report. Although the majority report contains many truths, and the viewer is encouraged to read both for possibly a personal opinion. Reports from the outcome of government investigations are in most cases neither black or white, but varying shades of gray. As far as Pearl Harbor is concerned, it takes a determined reader with a legal, military, and political background, and with extensive knowledge of human nature, to find the illusive truth in many reams of paper. This author only hopes to meet this criteria. And maybe there is a viewer in cyber-space who can help shed light with an email about a new finding, or just a comment.

The introductory extract from the minority report follows:

We, the undersigned, find it impossible to concur with the findings and conclusions of the Committee's [majority] report because they are illogical, and unsupported by the preponderance of the evidence before the Committee.  The conclusions of the diplomatic aspects are based upon incomplete evidence.
We, therefore, find it necessary to file a report setting forth the conclusions which we believe are properly sustained by evidence before the committee.

According to George Morgenstern on page 318, Pearl Harbor�The Story of the Secret War�"For the first time in any investigation, Roosevelt, Knox, and Stimson were flatly accused of responsibility, and Secretary Hull was inferentially accused." The following extract from Morgenstern supports this author's conclusion stated in the above paragraph. The minority report concluded:

Having examined the whole record made before the Joint Committee and having analyzed the same in the foregoing conclusions of fact and responsibility, we find the evidence supports the following final and ultimate conclusion:

The failure of Pearl Harbor to be fully alerted and prepared for defense rested upon the proper discharge of two sets of interdependent responsibilities: (1) the responsibilities of high authorities in Washington; and (2) the responsibilities of the commanders in the field in charge of the fleet and of the naval base.

The evidence clearly shows that these two area [sic] of responsibilities were inseparably essential to each other in the defense of Hawaii. The commanders in the field could not have prepared or been ready successfully to meet hostile attack at Hawaii without indispensable information, mat�el, trained manpower and clear orders from Washington. Washington could not be certain that Hawaii was in readiness without the alert and active cooperation of the commanders on the spot.

The failure to perform the responsibilities indispensably essential to the defense of Pearl Harbor rests upon the following civil and military authorities [in Washington]:

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT�President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.
HENRY L. STIMSON�Secretary of War.
FRANK KNOX�Secretary of the Navy.
GEORGE C. MARSHALL�General, Chief of Staff of the Army.
HAROLD R. STARK�Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations.
LEONARD T. GEROW�Major General, Assistant Chief of Staff of War Plans Division.

The failure to perform the responsibilities in Hawaii rests upon the military commanders:

WALTER C. SHORT�Major General, Commanding General Hawaiian Department.
HUSBAND E. KIMMEL�Rear Admiral, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Both in Washington and Hawaii there were numerous and serious failures of men in the lower civil and military echelons to perform their duties and discharge their responsibilities. These are too numerous to be treated in detail and individually named.

Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who was at the center of Japanese-American negotiations, bears a grave responsibility for the diplomatic conditions leading up to the eventuality of Pearl Harbor but he had no duties as a relevant link in the military chain of responsibility stemming from the commander-in-chief to the commanders at Hawaii for the defense at Pearl Harbor. For this reason and because the diplomatic phase was not completely explored we offer no conclusions in his case.

The minority report contained a statement concerning Roosevelt's responsibilities in the exercise of his duties, charging him with not only the failure in discharging those duties as they pertained to Pearl Harbor, but emphasizing that his responsibility encompassed the acts of his subordinates. The exact statement follows:

The President of the United States was responsible for the failure to enforce continuous, efficient, and appropriate co-operation [sic] among the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the chief of staff, and the chief of naval operations, in evaluating information and dispatching clear and positive orders to the Hawaiian commanders as events indicated the growing imminence of war; for the Constitution and laws of the United States vested in the President full power, as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, to compel such co-operation [sic] and vested this power in him alone with a view to establishing his responsibility to the people of the United States.

And finally, on page 321 Morgenstern writes that President Roosevelt knew his responsibilities. Speaking at a press conference on December 20, 1940�documented in Papers, 1940, p. 623�on the subject of administrative action, President Roosevelt said the following:

"There were two or three cardinal principles; and one of them is the fact that you cannot, under the Constitution, set up a second President of the United States. In other words, the Constitution states one man is responsible. Now that man can delegate away any part of the responsibility from the ultimate responsibility that rests on him."

The art of preserving history on paper is growing obsolete in this age of Information Technology. Books, magazines, newspaper articles, archive holdings, photographs, etc. will crumble to dust with all of us, and historical records will be lost and events forgotten. Contact the National Archives and inquire on the methods used through the years to store and preserve documents and materials. You will discover, as this author did, that most holdings are crumbling with age due to inadequate storage facilities.

This web site, if properly maintained and supported, will preserve the history of Pearl Harbor online for future generations by storing bits and bytes on a server at an Internet Service Provider's facility�ready for viewing on a computer system's monitor or laptop. And no need to flip to the back of a book searching for references.

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Web Site Contents

The Pearl Harbor web site contains this Pearl Harbor page and four subordinate pages: Secrets, Hearings, Impasse and Book Reviews.  The main topics of the Secrets page are Introduction, Chronological Narrative: Japan Primed for War, Purple Machine and Magic, JN25, Splendid Arrangement, Army and Navy Intelligence in Washington and Five Crucial Message Types.

An impasse of sorts surrounds key personnel and/or events concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor. There is no doubt that more will appear as "work in progress" is on the agenda. The topics covered on the Impasse page of this site are: Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum, Captain Howard D. Bode, Commodore Dudley W. Knox, U. S. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew and  The Congressional Minority Pearl Harbor Report.

Book buyers are encouraged to write reviews on books they purchase online at The Book Reviews page on this web site contains extracts from on the following books: Day of Deceit by Robert B. Stinnett, Scapegoats by Captain Edward L. Beach, Infamy�Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath by John Toland, At Dawn We Slept by Gordon W. Prange, And I Was There�Breaking The Secrets by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, Pearl Harbor�The Story of the Secret War by George Morgenstern. This author chose book reviews of the most positive and the most negative nature with hope of presenting the very best arguments from both sides.

The Hearings page contains information extracted from the Joint Congressional Committee hearing with links to the Roberts, Hart and Hewitt investigations.  The Secrets page contains links and detailed information on the various dispatches which were intercepted: Bomb Plot, Winds, War Warnings, 13 Parts, and Part 14.

Microsoft Front Page 2003�the program used to design this web site�does not support adding references in the form of footnotes or endnotes. When considered necessary, this author includes them within or immediately following the paragraph(s) or item(s) under discussion.

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Author, Web Master, and General Information: Stanley Anthony Golowski, Captain, USMC (Ret.)

Ownership of this site was transferred to CPU Doctor< Mark Crabbe on 12/4/2012.>

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